Zoom | Session 1 | MLAG Internal Research Seminar | Summer 2020
From: 2020-06-26 To:2020-06-26
Modern & Contemporary Philosophy
Mind, Language & Action
Seminário de Investigação Interno do MLAG Verão 2020
MLAG INTERNAL RESEARCH SEMINAR Summer 2020
The aim of this seminar-series is the discussion of recent or ongoing work of members of the research group MLAG (Institute of Philosophy, University of Porto). The first intended audience are MLAG members themselves, but we hope the discussions will be of interest to a wider audience so we will keep the sessions open (subject to registration). It is often the case that research lines are pursued unbeknownst of other members of the group, producing results that remain underdiscussed. So we decided to enter a period of self-knowledge. Everyone is invited to join – we will organize the sessions by Zoom so it is irrelevant where you are. We will try to organize sessions around the three main areas of our work: mind, language and action (although some of us are not very confortable with some of those words and would prefer to say that ‘thought’ and not mind is the main topic of our research)
Session 1 – Language
Charles Travis, With What The Force?
Abstract: Frege held that where there is truth, what the truth is (what it is that it is true) is always separable from what is asserted, or judged, in asserting or judging it. This is one thing which might be put in words, ‘Force is always separable from content’. Over the last 40 years or so, something so put has come to be doubted, first, perhaps, by certain would-be Wittgensteinians, but in this millenium from various quarters—from linguistic theory, for one, from a concern with ‘subjectivity’, or perhaps first-person thinking, for another. In each case, that is, something those words might express has been contested, though not obviously the same thing each time. But one thing in common to all these cases is that the proponent takes himself to have Frege in his sights (as a target). This talk is about two such objectors, Peter Hanks (representing linguistic theory) and Sebastian Rödl (representing something somehow post-Kantian). Neither, I will argue, actually has Frege in his sights. In each case light on the topic is thereby considerably dimmed. Hanks has, up to a point, a plausible thesis about linguistic meaning, though there is something crucial he fails to see as to what such meaning might be. It is much less clear what Rödl is up to. One lesson we can learn from both is that there is much light to be shone by attending to Frege’s fundamental abstraction: distinguishing the logical from the psychological.
Some recent or forthcoming work to be discussed:
- Sofia Miguens, The Logical Alien, Harvard UP, 2020.
- Charles Travis, Frege – The Pure Business of Being True, Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2020.
- Mattia Riccardi ed. (with Frank Larøi), Journal of Consciousness Studies, Special Issue on Hallucination, 23/7-8 (2016).
MLAG Internal Research Seminar | Summer 2020: https://ifilosofia.up.pt/activities/mlag-internal-research-seminar-summer-2020
Mind, Language and Action Group (MLAG)
Instituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto – FIL/00502