Kant calls the transcendental power of imagination a ‘blind yet indispensable function of the soul’ (Katvr A78/B103). Responsible for a host of sub-personal functions of integration which alone afford cognitive representations required for human self-consciousness of anything so much as appearing to occur before, during or after anything else, Kant’s transcendental power of imagination launches an anti-Cartesian philosophical revolution, of central importance today to the cognitive sciences – though Kant’s account provides richer resources than have yet been tapped (Brook 2016). Kant stresses that those \textit{a priori} conditions by which alone we can know (or be aware of) anything as an object, cannot themselves be known as objects (A402); he likewise stresses that we cannot assay our own transcendental power of imagination by conceptual or logical analysis, nor by introspection – neither can we do so empirically, not by any means available to Kant, nor to us today. How, then, can Kant use ‘transcendental reflection’ (A261/B317) to assay our cognitive architecture credibly? Answering this question, I shall show, charts the analytical proof structure of Kant’s \textit{Kritik der reinen Vernunft}.

Some suggested background readings, for those who may be so inclined:


Biographical Note. Kenneth R. Westphal is Professor of Philosophy, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi (Istanbul). His research focuses on the character and scope of rational justification in non-formal, substantive domains, both moral (ethics, justice, history and philosophy of law, philosophy of education) and theoretical (epistemology, history and philosophy of science). His books include Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism (Cambridge, 2004), \textit{How Hume and Kant Reconstruct Natural Law: Justifying Strict Objectivity without Debating Moral Realism} (Clarendon, 2016) and \textit{Grounds of Pragmatic Realism: Hegel’s Internal Critique and Transformation of Kant’s Critical Philosophy} (Brill, 2017). He is completing a new book, \textit{Normative Justification, Natural Law and Kant’s Constructivism in Hegel’s Moral Philosophy}, and plans a systematic study in history and philosophy of law focussing on Montesquieu, G.W.F. Hegel and Rudolf von Jhering. (Web: http://boun.academia.edu/KennethRWestphal)

westphal.k.r@gmail.com
Part I: Kant’s Critical Philosophy: A Synopsis

Kenneth R. Westphal
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi (İstanbul)

1 INTRODUCTION.

To understand basic features of Kant’s methods and strategies requires understanding what is specifically ‘Critical’ about Kant’s ‘Critical Philosophy’? What method(s) does Kant use, and what sort(s) of justification can it provide for Kant’s analyses and conclusions?

Part I addresses the first two questions, by characterising Kant’s Critical philosophy (§§2, 3). These sections are drawn from my new book, Grounds of Pragmatic Realism: Hegel’s Internal Critique & Transformation of Kant’s Critical Philosophy (Brill, 2017), whence my initial remark about Hegel’s remarkable realisation that Kant’s Critical philosophy can stand on its own, without Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, thanks to Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference. Part II, my main topic, then examines how Kant constructs his Critique of pure reason, so as to identify the manifold, integrated functions and roles of transcendental power of imagination, and of explicit cognitive judgment. (The handouts for Part II are formatted latterally.)

2 KANT’S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A SYNOPSIS.

My central aim is to show that Hegel reconstructed Kant’s Critical philosophy sans transcendental idealism, and to reconstruct, assess and defend how Hegel did so. Hegel’s further development of Kant’s Critical philosophy has been obscured by excessive attention (pro et contra) to transcendental idealism, and insufficient attention to the aims, methods and substance of Kant’s systematic Critical philosophy. This imbalance is not due to lack of good information (cf. Watson 1881, 1908; Caird 1889). Here I first summarise basic features of Kant’s methods and strategies (§2), then review his key questions (§3.1), his main Critical writings (§3.2), his main issues and theses (§3.3) and his systematic Critical philosophy (§3.4), which comprises Kant’s systematic critique of rational judgment, its character, scope and limits, throughout his three Critiques and his Critical metaphysics of natural and of moral sciences.

2.1 Kant’s Critical Falliblism. Kant’s Critical philosophy develops a sophisticated alternative to what remain today the default options regarding cognitive justification: empiricism, rationalism, intuitionism, coherentism, reliabilism, conventionalism or scepticism, none of which are sufficient, whether in epistemology or in moral philosophy, and most of which are demonstrably false. My focus here is epistemology. Kant recognised the insufficiency of conceptual analysis for obtaining philosophical knowledge (KdrV B755–8). One aspect of this problem concerns the Paradox of Analysis: If, in order to avoid petitio principii against scepticism, epistemology is to be purely a priori, then it must seek to analyse and understand human knowledge by analysing the concept of human knowledge, and hence its three constitutive sub-concepts: belief, truth and justification. If the analysis of these concepts is to be informative, it must be possible to learn or understand something new by sufficiently analysing these concepts, their relations and their proper use. However, if conceptual analysis is informative, how is it possible to determine whether that analysis is accurate, complete or adequate? If we can determine

---

1 A concise summary of basic concepts, principles and views in epistemology is provided by Westphal (2016c); for concise summary of Hume’s epistemology, see Stroud (2010). The counterpart issues in moral philosophy are examined in Westphal (2018d).
whether a conceptual analysis is complete and accurate, how can it be informative? If we can determine or assess the success of a conceptual analysis, so doing apparently would require complete and adequate antecedent understanding or mastery of the concept(s) analysed. This ‘Paradox of Analysis’ was a central methodological concern from Moore up to about 1990, after which it fell off the philosophical agenda. In effect, the best solutions to this Paradox recognise it is insoluble, and maintain instead that the proper philosophical method is conceptual explication (e.g., Hare 1960). This is Kant’s method (KdrV B755–8, and also (e.g) Carnap’s (1950a, 1–18). Conceptual explication cannot claim to be complete; it aims to improve upon the concept explicated, in part by clarifying that concept, or augmenting it or replacing some of its features. Conceptual explications can only be assessed within their actual contexts of proper use, not in merely imaginary contexts of their purportedly possible use. Conceptual explication thus involves significant aspects of fallibilism regarding philosophical justification.

Kant espoused fallibilism about empirical knowledge (KdrV A766–7/B794–5), and also about his philosophical method (KdrV B862), which he called ‘transcendental reflection’ (KdrV A260–1/B316–7). According to the justificatory alternative, ‘infallibilism’, justification sufficient for knowledge entails the truth of what is known. Infallibilism was not bequeathed to philosophy by Descartes, but instead much earlier by Étienne Tempier, who in March 1277 acted upon Papal authority as Bishop of Paris to condemn 220 neo-Aristotelian theses as heretical (Piché 1999, Boulter 2011). This is when, where and how Aristotle’s avowedly flexible model of a proper science, modelled on Euclidian geometry but fitted to the degree of precision afforded by any range or domain of phenomena, became converted into infallibilist deductivism, which entered the empiricist and mainstream epistemological traditions by dissatisfaction with Descartes’ attempt to outwit the possibility of a malign deceiving spirit, and by Hume’s doctrine of impressions and ideas. Tempier’s condemnation expressly states and repeatedly implies that knowledge requires demonstrating the logical impossibility of any and all alternatives to whatever one claims to know. Accordingly, he declares that natural philosophers may only propose ‘possible explanations’ of natural phenomena. This may be a brilliant ploy to exalt faith over human reason, but is an epistemological disaster. The infallibilist-deductivist model of a ‘proper’ science remained profoundly influential from Descartes through the Twentieth Century (C.E.), e.g., in Kelsen’s model of a ‘pure’ theory of law and in varieties of philosophical ‘formalism’. Kant, too, was enthralled by this model; it drives his Transcendental Idealism, and it drives his increasingly ambitious, increasingly implausible claims for Transcendental Idealism in his late, ‘post-Critical’ manuscripts.

2.2 Key Features of Rational Judgment. Central to Kant’s critique of our human powers of judgment are five basic yet widely neglected points:

1. Reasoning using rules or principles always requires judgment to guide the proper use and application of the rule or principle to the case(s) at hand (KdrV B169–75). Specifying rules of application cannot avoid this, because using such rules of application also requires judgment.

2. Rational judgment is inherently normative, insofar as it contrasts to mere response to circumstances by forming or revising beliefs, because judgment involves considering whether, how

---

or to what extent the considerations one now draws together in forming and considering a specific judgment (conclusion) are integrated as they ought to be integrated to form a cogent, justifiable judgment (KdrV A261–3/B317–9, B219).

3. Rational judgment is in these same regards inherently self-critical: judging some circumstance(s) or consideration(s) involves and requires assessing whether or the extent to which one assesses those circumstances or considerations as they ought best be assessed (KdrV A261–3/B317–9, B219).

4. Rational judgment is inherently social and communicable (KdU §40), insofar as judging some circumstances or considerations rationally involves acknowledging the distinction in principle between merely convincing oneself that one has judged properly, and actually judging properly by properly assessing the matter(s) and relevant considerations at hand.

5. Recognising one’s own fallibility, one’s own potentially incomplete information or analysis and one’s own theoretical or practical predilections requires that we each check our own judgments, first, by determining as well as we can whether the grounds and considerations integrated in any judgment we pass are such that they can be communicated to all others, who can assess our grounds and judgment, so as also to find them adequate (KdrV A829/B857); and second, by actually communicating our judgments and considerations to others and seeking and considering their assessment of our judgments and considerations (GS 8:145–7).

Our rational powers of judgment can be honed by training and practice, but cannot be acquired by learning or study; they are thus, Kant noted, suitably called ‘mother wit’ (KdrV A133/B172).

2.3 Judgment and Cognitive Reference. Kant’s positive alternative to infallibilist deductivism develops the implications of some basic points regarding specifically cognitive reference to particulars. Kant noted, that is, that thinking requires only logical consistency; knowing something requires identifying relevant particulars by individuating or discriminating them (KdrV Bxxvi n.). In just this regard, Kant adopted from Tetens (1775) this sense of the verb, to ‘realise’ (realisieren): to ‘realize’ a concept or principle is to demonstrate by example that we can locate, individuate or discriminate relevant instances of that concept or principle (KdrV B186–7). Localising relevant instances requires demonstrative reference to them, whether by sensory perception, or also by using observational instruments (in technical or scientific contexts). If this may sound anachronistic, it is not; it is explicit in Tetens, whom Kant expressly and consistently follows in this terminological and substantive regard. Moreover, what philosophers of language call ‘demonstrative’ reference to particular individuals is known in other fields as ‘deixis’ (Bohnemeyer 2015), the transliteration of the Attic Greek term, δείκτης, central to Stoic accounts of indexical or demonstrative reference (Mates 1961, 30, 96; Barnes 1997, 98, 101–2, 137–8). (If Kant likely did not know these Stoic views, Hegel did; they are discussed critically by Sextus Empiricus.) These Stoic sources are secondary in respect to the philosophical issues, yet they caution against contemporary philosophers’ tendency to dismiss historical philosophy, and Hegel’s devotees against their tendency to dismiss issues of justification, epistemology and cognitive reference.


4 I am very grateful to Mauro Nasti de Vincentis (2018) for directing my attention to Stoic δείκτης, and for sharing his research with me prior to publication.
Kant’s express distinction between merely thinking something, and thinking something about any particular(s), which requires localising and referring to it (or to them), is crucial in several philosophical regards. First, this distinction provides the basis for a quintuple distinction utterly fundamental to epistemology between:

1. Thinking some specific thought, or entertaining some specific prospective judgment, proposition or belief.
2. Ascribing what one thinks, believes or judges to some particular(s).
3. Ascribing accurately or truly what one thinks, believes or judges to some particular(s).
4. Justifiedly ascribing accurately or truly what one thinks, believes or judges to some particular(s) (where the relevant justification is cognitive).
5. Ascribing accurately or truly what one thinks, believes or judges to some particular(s) with sufficient cognitive justification to constitute knowledge.

Per (1.), merely thinking something consistently does not suffice to know anything, other than perhaps what one happens to be thinking at that time. Per (2.), ascribing features or characteristics, including shape, size and location, to some (putative) particular(s) is necessary for there to be any issue about truth, falsehood, accuracy or inaccuracy. Per (3.), sufficiently accurate or true ascription of features to some particular(s) is necessary for knowledge, yet insufficient. Knowledge further requires, not merely some cognitive justification (per 4.), but sufficient cognitive justification (per 5.).

These distinctions allow considerable latitude regarding tolerable (in)accuracy or precision, and what extent or degree of accuracy or cognitive justification suffices for knowledge, in contrast to reasonable belief. Nevertheless, they suffice to rebut Russell’s (1911) doctrines of ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ and ‘knowledge by description’, and to rebut both rationalism and experience-transcendent metaphysics. Indeed, Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference achieves one of the key aims of verification empiricism, without invoking verificationism about meaning, nor about semantic or mental content (intension)! Hegel capitalised on this insight when disentangling Kant’s sound critique of rational judgment from his Transcendental Idealism.⁵

Kant’s (and Hegel’s) semantics of singular cognitive reference puts them in accord with a remarkable series of later-day philosophers, including: Frege, J.L. Austin, Wittgenstein, David Kaplan, John Perry, Howard Wettstein, Nathan Salmon, Gareth Evans (1975), Charles Travis and Ilhan Inan. They stand together against what has become ‘mainstream’ epistemology and philosophy of language, from Russell (1911) through Quine, Davidson, Putnam, van Fraassen and beyond into contemporary ‘analytic metaphysics’.⁶ This quintuple distinction sets one parameter for any sound epistemology.

2.4 **Kant’s Three-fold Strategy.** Kant observes:

That which is presupposed in any and all knowledge of objects cannot itself be known as an object. (KdrV A402)

⁵ On Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference, see KTPR §§60–64.
⁶ On Quine, see Westphal (2015b); on van Fraassen, see [Westphal 2017], §119, and Westphal (forthcoming b); on Davidson, see Westphal (2016b); on Putnam, see Westphal (2003b).
Empiricism denies there are any such cognitive presuppositions. However, empiricists routinely assert this denial; only three have developed the fundamentals of concept empiricism and empiricist semantics in detail: Hume, C.D. Broad and Carnap. Their attempts are enormously important and instructive, not least because they reveal just why, how and where empiricism fails.  

Kant’s strategy is three-fold: First, to inventory our most basic cognitive capacities, then to construct the minimum sufficient principles of cognitive judgment afforded by our cognitive capacities to enable us to think, experience or know anything at all. In brief, Kant’s fundamental inventory – the first phase of his strategy – consists in our two forms of sensory receptivity, which are spatial and temporal, and the twelve formal aspects of our forms of judgment. Though Kant did not detail his completeness proof for his Table of Judgments, he provided many important indicators, which suffice to reconstruct and to justify his completeness claim (Wolff 1995, 2017). The second phase of Kant’s strategy is to identify the most fundamental concepts afforded by those twelve formal aspects of judgment: our Categories, plus the concepts of ‘time’ and of ‘space’, and then to identify the minimum sufficient set of schemata and cognitive principles required for us to be able (sub-personally) to integrate sensory information over time and through space, so as to be able to be aware of some appearances appearing to occur before, during or after others (Guyer 1989, Brook 2004, Westphal 2018b). The third phase is to use these results to provide a systematic diagnosis of persisting philosophical disagreements, both in theoretical and in practical philosophy.

2.5 Kant’s Methodological Constructivism. Kant’s method is expressly constructivist (KdrV B735; O’Neill 1992). Constructivist method is a method for identifying and justifying concepts or principles; it is consistent with realism about particulars within the domain(s) of those concepts or principles. The constructivist strategy has four steps: Within some specified domain,

1. Identify a preferred domain of basic elements;
2. Identify and sort relevant, prevalent elements within this domain;
3. Use the most salient and prevalent such elements to construct satisfactory principles or accounts of the initial domain, by using
4. Preferred principles of construction.

This constructivist method is fallibilist. Kant acknowledged this, and recognised that the most fundamental idea of a new discipline, including Kant’s very idea of Critical philosophy, is subject to re-assessment and often to reformulation and re-articulation in the course of developing that discipline (KdrV B862). Carnap, too, was a constructivist in philosophy of science, though he made this explicit only in 1950, when he explicated his method of conceptual explication (Carnap 1950a, 1–18). Carnap’s (1950b) ‘linguistic frameworks’ are conceptual explications writ large, as language fragments designed to perform some designated task within some branch of scientific inquiry.

Kant expressly distinguished between general logic and various specific forms of logic, most centrally: transcendental logic as the study of the legitimate and illegitimate use of fundamental concepts and principles in making (putative) cognitive judgments. Kant’s distinction is sound; general logic is exhausted by a careful reconstruction of Aristotle’s squares of opposition (Wolff 2009a). Only within that domain are conclusions provable by formal considerations

---

7 See, respectively, Westphal (2013a), Turnbull (1959) and Westphal (2015b).
alone. All further formalised domains can be specified and developed only by appeal to further, non-formal semantic and existence postulates. (This holds too for mathematics, which requires sets, for mathematical logic and for predicate calculus.) Their accuracy, adequacy or soundness cannot be assessed by purely formal techniques alone. Only within pure axiomatics is justification constituted by formal deduction (provability). Within all other domains, deductive validity can be necessary for justification, though in principle it cannot suffice for justification. Accordingly, infallibilism is only appropriate to purely formal axiomatics; all other domains afford only fallibilist accounts of justification. However, Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference suffices to show that mere logical possibilities – expressed by any logically consistent thought – altogether lack cognitive standing, and so cannot serve to undermine or to ‘defeat’ cognitive justification in any non-formal domain! In non-formal domains, infallibilism is not too strict; in principle it is instead irrelevant! In non-formal domains, deduction may contribute to cognitive justification, it may be necessary to it, but in principle it is not sufficient for cognitive justification, nor does it constitute cognitive justification. Only alternatives which can be deictically (ostensively, demonstratively) referred to identified, localised particular(s) are cognitively relevant. Cognitive relevance is inherently domain-specific; which domain(s) are relevant and how they are relevant must also be assessed critically, on the basis of continuing use, inquiry and self-critical reflection.

A further consequence of these insights is that rationality is not identical to deductive validity; rationality affords the critical assessment of evidence, principles, reasons, reasoning and judgments, in any specified context, and over time and across space through other relevant contexts. In these regards, rationality – both in cognition and in morals – is fundamentally (though not exclusively) practical reasoning (O’Neill 2004).

If Kant’s Critical philosophy successfully develops and integrates its three strategic phases (above, §2.4), it justifies his claim that none of the traditional alternatives: empiricism, rationalism, intuitionism, coherentism, reliabilism, conventionalism or scepticism, are tenable accounts of human knowledge; and provides excellent grounds to contend, as he did, that there is only one genuine philosophy: the Critical philosophy (MdS, Preface; 6:206–7). Despite many extensive and often illuminating attempts to revive prospects for one or another of those standard alternatives, I have over the past three decades argued repeatedly en detail that they are indeed instructive, yet in principle and in practice irreparably flawed.

2.6 Transcendental Proof and Transcendental Idealism. Does Critical philosophy require Transcendental Idealism? Kant claims that transcendental analysis and proof require Transcendental Idealism.8 Kant’s critics and devotees alike have accepted this claim, and often compounded their perplexity by presuming that anything which counts as ‘synthetic a priori’ must invoke a priori intuitions of reality itself. This presumption assimilates Kant’s Critical philosophy to the kind of rationalism Kant Critically rejected – as did Hegel. Kant’s analysis and a priori justification of many fundamental synthetic claims and principles involves no intuitionism of any kind, much less rationalist intuitions of some allegedly ultimate reality (cf. Toulmin 1949).

Far more instructive is to inquire whether transcendental analysis and proof require Transcendental Idealism, by examining whether Kant’s own analyses and proofs in the Critique of Pure Reason substantiate this claim. Hegel’s central method of developing strictly internal cri-

---

tique and assessment of philosophical views requires such an examination. Hegel’s early Jena writings identify central points of such a strictly internal critical assessment of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. These points help to show how Kant’s own transcendental analyses and proofs in the Critique of Pure Reason directly undermine his own arguments for Transcendental Idealism, and reveal key aspects of sound transcendental proofs of mental content externalism.

With these strategic, methodological and substantive features of Kant’s Critical philosophy in view, I now catalogue Kant’s Critical writings (§3.1), his central questions (§3.2), his core issues and theses (§3.3) and then chart his Critical system of philosophy (§3.4). So doing suggests how Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference suffices to justify his key epistemological conclusions without appeal to Transcendental Idealism. (Hegel’s key Critical insight is that everything summarised in §3 can be re-founded, justified and augmented sans Transcendental Idealism.)

3 KANT’S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OUTLINED.

3.1 Kant’s Key Questions. Kant states his key Critical questions succinctly:

“The field of philosophy in this cosmopolitan sense can be brought down to the following questions:

1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?
4. What is man? (Was ist der Mensch?)

Metaphysics answers the first question, morals the second, religion the third, and anthropology the fourth. Fundamentally, however, we could reckon all of this as anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last one’. (Jäsche Logic, GS 9:25; cf. KdrV A805–6/B832–3)

Kant answers (mainly) in these Critical works:

What can I know?  ➞  KdrV, MA
What ought I do?  ➞  KdpV, Gr, Md
What may I hope?  ➞  KdpV, KdU, Rel.
What is it to be human?  ➞  all the above + Anthropology, Pädagogik & essays: politics, history.

3.2 Kant’s Main Critical Writings:


KdrV  Critique of Pure Reason, 1st edition  KdrV  1781 ‘A’  4:3–251 (to A405)
2nd rev. edition  KdrV  1787 ‘B’ 3

KdpV  Critique of Practical Reason.  KprV  1788 §  5:3–163


MA  Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.  MA  1786 §  4:467–565

Gr  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.  Gr  1785 p.  4:387–463

I  Metaphysical First Principles of Justice  RL  1797, 1798 §  6:203–372
II  Metaphysical First Principles of Virtue  TL  1798 §  6:373–493

Rel.  Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone.  Rel.  1793, 1794 p.  6:1–202

3.3  **Kant’s Main Critical Problems.**

**Empirical knowledge:**  How is empirical knowledge at all possible for us?

**Scepticism:**

- **Sextus Empiricus:** The Dilemma of the Criterion.
  Whether our sensory presentations relate to physical objects?

- **Hume:**
  Causality = (merely) 1:1 correlations + habitual expectations.
  The Problem of Induction.

**Mathematics:** How is mathematics as a system of synthetic propositions known *a priori* at all possible for us?

**Natural Science:** How is Newtonian physics as a science at all possible for us?

**Space and Time:** Absolute *vs* relational theories of space and time.

  additionally (later) How is natural science of organised matter – e.g., crystallisation, chemical bonding, organic life – at all possible for us?

**Morals:** How is moral obligation at all possible for us?

- Moral empiricism, utilitarianism, eudaimonism.
- The ‘naturalistic fallacy’: inferring ‘ought’ from ‘is’. (Hume, Moore)
- Moral duties are categorical, universal and necessary; none of these characteristics can be justified merely empirically.
- Freedom of action *vs* natural causal determinism?

**Aesthetics (Taste):** How are universally valid judgments of taste (and of the natural sublime), which are not based on any determinate concept of any object, at all possible for us?

**Metaphysics:** How is metaphysics as a system of synthetic propositions known *a priori* at all possible for us?

1. **Rational Psychology:** The soul is a substance.
   The soul is simple.
   The soul is numerically unitary, self-identical.
   Possibly, the soul perceives physical objects in its surroundings.¹⁰

   *t.s.*¹¹ None of these theses can be proven (rationally justified).

2. **Rational cosmology:** Whether the world has an origin in space *vs* time.
   Whether matter is infinitely divisible.
   Whether natural causal determinism excludes freedom of action.
   Whether there is a necessary being (cosmological proof of God).

   *t.s.:* Equally conclusive proofs support both the affirmative and the negative theses; this is an inevitable, necessary self-contradiction of reason, if it seeks knowledge transcending experience.

3. **Rational Theology:** The ontological  
   The cosmological  
   The teleological  

   *t.s.:* In principle, all of these purported proofs are invalid.

---

⁹ *t.e., (using ‘∗⇒’ for ‘entails’), is this polsyllogism justified: Universal natural causal determinism ∗ (no freedom of action) ∗ (no imputability) ∗ (no moral responsibility) ∗ (no morality)?

¹⁰ *t.e., any indirect theory of perception, which affirms our self-knowledge, but makes dubious our experience of our surroundings.

¹¹ ‘*t.s.*’ = ‘to show’ = to be proven.
KANT’S CENTRAL THESIS: All the above metaphysical questions are in principle unanswerable by human reason, for systematic reasons. Systematic examination of these reasons provides sufficient basis for conclusively answering the main questions of each of these four topics: scepticism and natural science, moral philosophy and freedom, aesthetics and taste, theology and faith.

3.4 Kant’s System of Critical Philosophy.

I. Critique of Reason: Cognitions a priori from concepts and principles
Method: transcendental reflection (KdrV A260–1/B316–7)

Critique of pure theoretical reason

Doctrine of Elements: Transcendental Aesthetic: Space, Time
Transcendental Analytic: Analytic of Concepts
Analytic of Principles
Transcendental Dialectic: Transcendental Ideas
The Antinomy of pure theo. reason
The Ideal of pure theoretical reason
Regulative use of Ideas of pure reason

Doctrine of Method: Discipline of pure theoretical reason
Canon of pure theoretical reason
Architectonic of pure theoretical reason
History of pure theoretical reason

Critique of pure practical reason: KdpV

Critique of reflecting power of judgment:
Regarding systematising our knowledge of nature KdrV Tr. Dialectic
Regarding purposiveness KdU
Regarding free beauty and natural sublime KdU 1: Taste
Regarding naturally organized matter:
non-living self-organised nature: crystals, chemical compounds; organic life regarding nature as a whole or as created KdU Doct. Method

II. Critical Metaphysics

A priori analysis of a logically contingent concept of a basic kind of being; two kinds:

1. embodied rational agent: ➔ critical metaphysics of morals Gr, MdS
   first principles of justice Mds 1 Rechtslehre
   first principles of virtue Mds 2 Tugendlehre

2. matter = ‘the movable in space’: ➔ critical metaphysics of nature
   transcendental philosophy (not ontology) KdrV Tr. Analytic
   rational physiology12 of pure reason
   immanent: rational physics MAaDn
   rational psychology —
   rat. doctrine of natural organisation (crystals, chemicals; life): KdU 2: Teleology
   transcendent: transcendental13 cosmology
   transcendental theology KdpV, Rel.

---

12 Kant often uses ‘physiology’ in its ancient Greek sense, from φύσις, a study of something’s nature (physis).
13 Here Kant uses ‘transcendental’ in its traditional metaphysical (experience-transcendent).