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From: 2018-11-20 To:2018-11-20

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  • Thematic Line

    Modern & Contemporary Philosophy
  • Research Group

    Mind, Language & Action


    Thomas Raleigh (University of Antwerp)


    20 de novembro 2018 (terça-feira)

    15h30 | Sala do Departamento de Filosofia (Torre B - Piso 1)

    Entrada livre


    Resumo: According to a certain kind of naïve or folk understanding of physical matter, everyday ‘solid’ objects are composed of a homogeneous, gap-less substance that wholly fills the space they occupy. A further claim, endorsed by a number of prominent philosophers, is that our perceptual experience of the environment represents that the objects around us conform to this sort of conception of physical matter. Were this further claim correct, it would mean that the way that the world appears to us in experience conflicts with the deliverances of our best current scientific theories in the following respect: perceptual experience would be intrinsically misleading concerning the structure of physical matter. I argue against this further claim. Experience in itself is not committed to any such conception of the nature of physical matter. The naïve/folk conception of matter in question cannot simply be ‘read-off’ from perceptual appearances. En route to this conclusion I briefly consider some empirical results from Marisa Carrasco's lab and also recount an anecdote about Wittgenstein.

    Bio: Thomas Raleigh did his PhD at King's College London under the supervision of Charles Travis. He has since taught in Mexico (UNAM), Canada (Concordia), Norway (NTNU), Vienna and at the Ruhr University Bochum. He is currently working on a project on Mental Imagery with Professor Bence Nanay at the Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp. His research is primarily in Philosophy of Mind and Epistemology, though he also has active research interests in Metaphysics and Early Analytic Philosophy – especially Russell & Wittgenstein.


    Imagem: Avigdor Arikha, Experience-Untitled (1957)


    Programa MLAG Research Seminars: https://ifilosofia.up.pt/activities/mlag-research-seminar-2018-2019 


    Research Group Mind Language and Action Group (MLAG)
    MLAG Seminars 2018-2019 (Sofia Miguens, Diana Couto, José Pedro Correia, João Silva)

    Instituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto - FIL/00502
    Financiamento: FCT

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