WHAT PROOFS ARE REALLY FOR
From: 2018-11-06 To:2018-11-06
Thematic Line
Modern & Contemporary Philosophy
Research Group
Mind, Language & Action
WHAT PROOFS ARE REALLY FOR
Bogdan Dicher* (University of Lisbon)
6 de novembro 2018 (terça-feira)
15h30 | Sala de Reuniões 2
Entrada livre
Os interessados em assistir ao seminário poderão ter acesso ao respetivo artigo, no qual se baseará a apresentação, devendo para isso enviar um e-mail para researchseminar.mlag@gmail.com expressando o seu interesse.
Resumo: Restall (Multiple conclusions, 2005) defends a bilateral interpretation of the sequent calculus according in which sequents are clashing positions consisting of assertions (in the antecedent) and denials (in the succedent). While this interpretation works quite well for classical logic, it is rather less convincing when applied to intuitionist logic. For intuitionists, the bilateral interpretation of Cut has a distinctive *tertium non datur* aroma and, furthermore, it yields too weak a notion of (internal) consequence. This talk is about dealing with these difficulties. After arguing that bilateralists like Restall should be worried about them, I will try to show how a certain perspective on logic, derived from Blok and Jónsson’s analysis of consequence relations may help overcome them.
*Bogdan Dicher: FCT-postdoc at the university of Lisbon, working mainly on philosophy of logic and proof-theory.
Webpage: http://bdicher.me/.
Imagem: Jackson Pollock, Number 26 (1949)
Programa MLAG Research Seminars: https://ifilosofia.up.pt/activities/mlag-research-seminar-2018-2019
Organização:
Research Group Mind Language and Action Group (MLAG)
MLAG Seminars 2018-2019 (Sofia Miguens, Diana Couto, José Pedro Correia, João Silva)
Instituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto - FIL/00502
Financiamento: FCT