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**SOME NOTES ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE 16TH CENTURY MEDICAL LITERATURE ON  
THE NATURE OF EMOTIONS IN F. SUAREZ'S DE PASSIONIBUS**

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1. Some notes on the concept of Iberian Scholasticism

We commonly name as Second Scholasticism, Iberian Scholasticism or Baroque Scholasticism the intellectual movement structured around the School of Salamanca in the early sixteenth century which disseminated to other Spanish universities and the Portuguese universities of Coimbra and Évora in the second half of the same century. The doctrines explained by these scholars and flourished from this academic context are preserved either in printed or manuscript form, being its influence crucial in the outlining of the European *forma mentis* of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

However the designation «Second Scholasticism» is far from being agreed on among scholars, due to the lack of adaptability between the word and the reality it refers to. In fact, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, we can notice discontinuity to a certain extent in the scholastic teaching modelled in the universities of the thirteenth century on which it is based. Such remoteness from the medieval model is due to a complex set of factors and to the emergence of the movement designated as Renaissance Humanism. Nevertheless, even if this movement affected the European *forma mentis*, the medieval Scholastic paradigm did not disappear. In fact, it persisted throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, alongside the Renaissance Humanism<sup>1</sup>, being influenced by it to the point that the concept of Scholastic

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<sup>1</sup> Charles NAUERT points out the continuity between the medieval age and the Renaissance, touching on more radical interpretations on the innovative character of the movement known as Renaissance

Humanism, apparently contradictory, can be introduced while also recognizing, in documents, that the exact characterization of the semantic content of the concept is still to be defined <sup>2</sup>.

The use of the history of thought on the basis of commentary structure is a feature of the medieval scholastic teaching, and keeps, along with over three centuries of intellectual work, on the teaching of the period denominated as the Second Scholasticism. In fact, the great review of the history of philosophy produced in peninsular universities in the sixteenth century reveal that their authors have a profuse knowledge of the past, now including quotations of late medieval scholastic authors and of works by Humanists, as well as quotations from classical authors harvested either in written content closer to philosophy, as happens for example with Cicero's *Tusculanas Disputationes*, or in the works in the domain of poetry, as that of the writings of Virgil or Horace. Indeed, one is surprised by the immense heritage of scholarship that these works reveal.

This is a typical feature of this period's works, either printed or preserved in manuscript form. It is likely that these authors had the intention of producing a doctrinal synthesis which each topic or philosophical question gathers all that was said both east and west,

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Humanism, arising mainly in the late nineteenth century and existing along the twentieth century. This expert on the Renaissance acknowledges having had to change perspective, given the evidence of documentary sources for the study of this period of history of the West: «The medievalists are at least partly right: the Renaissance is not the beginning of the cultural dynamism of Western society, but rather a highly significant reorientation of an advanced civilization already two or three centuries old. (...) The humanistic culture did not produce a new philosophy to replace scholasticism, which continued not only to exist but also to develop along lines that were intellectually sound and philosophically fruitful.» Ch. NAUERT, *Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe*, Cambridge University Press, New York, <sup>2</sup>2006, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Pasnau emphasizes the obscurity which still involves our knowledge of what occurred in the philosophical domain in XIV-XVII centuries: «The human mind tends to suppose that what it does not know about does not exist, and for our four centuries this fallacy is especially misleading. The almost unknown era of philosophy between 1400 and 1600 gave rise to vast quantities of material, much of which still survives. Although the fifteen century is practically terra incognita to modern scholars, we have more philosophical texts from that century than from the previous two centuries combined, and more studies of Aristotle from the sixteenth century than we have from the whole prior history of Latin Aristotelianism, all the way back to Boethius». R. PASNAU, *Metaphysical Themes, 1274-1671*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2011, p. 3.

by both pagan and Christian philosophers, during the patristic and scholastic revival and medieval age. The above mentioned sequence is common among the quotations of these authors while analyzing particular issues. This can be verified, for example, in the Commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*, produced in Coimbra<sup>3</sup>. This Commentary is assumed as the completion of a corporate project, hence, that of Conimbricenses, to whom the Curia General of the Jesuits ordered the preparation of a doctrinal synthesis, as complete as possible, concerning philosophical matters, where it adequately met their propaedeutic function to serve the study of philosophy in the Jesuit universities then expanding worldwide. However, even in this work, generated by its specific context and its specific purpose, underlies an intention of fidelity to the Thomistic doctrine, one notes the presence of the literature by authors of the Humanism, even in such innovative aspects such as that of the fields of optical or medical science<sup>4</sup>. The fact indicates that the existence of a corporate teaching, with a common doctrinal aim, does not invalidate the free use and organization of sources, and even a process of thought to some extent free.

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<sup>3</sup> *Comentário do Colégio Conimbricense da Companhia de Jesus. Sobre os Três Livros do Tratado da Alma, de Aristóteles Estagirita*. Translated by M.C. CAMPS. Introduction, Appendix and Bibliography by M. SANTIAGO DE CARVALHO. Sílabo, Lisboa, 2010. For different reasons, both contextual and related to the history of the dissemination of this work, this one is the most famous Commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* produced in the 16th century's Portuguese universities and is part of the work known as *Cursus Conimbricensis*, which contains the whole commentaries corresponding of the philosophical study in Coimbra's Faculty of Arts, edited in five volumes, some of them in Lisbon others in Coimbra, between 1552 and 1606. However, there are other complete Commentaries on Aristotle's *De anima* of the same period, remaining in manuscript form in Portuguese libraries. For a better understand of the 16<sup>th</sup> century debate on the relation between the body, the soul and mind in the definition of what is human in humans, it is important to analyze these commentaries, especially those written by prominent philosophy and theology teachers as Pedro da Fonseca (dated 1559, the commentary is not signed, but there is strong arguments for its attribution to Fonseca; it subsists in codex F3 from University of Coimbra Library) and Cristóvão Gil (dated 1591 and subsisting in codices 2516 and 2518, from de Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal). These commentaries are now being analyzed by a research team led by Paula Oliveira e Silva in the Instituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto.

<sup>4</sup> For the influence of renaissance humanism in the University of Coimbra and particularly in its Faculty of Arts, see M. SANTIAGO DE CARVALHO, "Introdução" in *Comentário do Colégio Conimbricense da Companhia de Jesus. Sobre os Três Livros do Tratado da Alma, de Aristóteles Estagirita*, op. cit, pp. 34-39.

Concerning Suarez' philosophy and theology, one cannot forget the criticism of anti-Thomism that was targeted by its members and his own defense by insisting on his personal way of teaching, not as a commentator but as someone who exposes his own way of thinking <sup>5</sup>.

From contact with the texts and authorities of this period arises our belief of the urgent necessity not only to find the correct name for that which in this period of the history of Western philosophy and culture is produced, namely in Portugal and Spain (or in transboundary but by authors that somehow intersect with this geographic area), but rather the urgency to show, through a systematic study of the works and doctrines produced, the identity of the worldliness conveyed by the sources, as well as their membership to the culture of its time, deeply marked by humanist movement and specifically the new contributions of science in this period.

The present study intends to be a contribution in this direction, demystifying texts and authors, showing ways of reading that disassociate themselves from preconceived mental structures. Dennis Des Chene refers to these Jesuit authors - Manuel de Gois, Francisco Suárez, Rodrigues de Arriaga, among others - using the expression belonging, as he says, to Stephen Menn as –“liberal Jesuits Scholastics” <sup>6</sup> - and highlights something that is now a common-place, namely the fact that the philosophical and theological doctrines taught in Jesuit schools and particularly in the Iberian Peninsula, were later propagated throughout Europe. Therefore they are to some extent at the origin of European framework, even if suddenly by criticism and rejection of the contents as in the case of the *novatores*. Albeit a movement of rejection or of assimilation, even significant - as occurs, for example, in the case of the reception of works like Suarez' *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, in the seventeenth century in German universities – the influence of the doctrinal corpus produced by Jesuit schools in the sixteenth century is undeniable, either in the field of philosophy or in theology. By contrast, if a movement of critical assimilation or rejection of these doctrines is found in

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<sup>5</sup>The basis of the charge would be a review of the Suárez Part I of the Summa of theology on divine predestination. Suarez' excuse can be read in the letter addressed to Everando Mercurial Company's General (Valladolid, 2 de Julio 1579), in defense of the visitor Diego de Avellaneda's charge of anti-thomism. Cf A. PONCELA, Francisco Suarez Lector of Metaphysics Γ Λ y, Celarayn, Leon, 2000.

<sup>6</sup> D. DES CHENE, *Life's Form. Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2000, p. 3.

the European context, regarding the New World, a movement of *translation studii* can be verified in the sixteenth century. In fact, it is the Jesuit model of teaching, forged in the Iberian Peninsula that will be exported, in the mentality and in the books of the missionaries to the then newly discovered territories in America, and even further, to Asia. These historiographical factors increase in our days the acquaintance to the doctrinal corpus produced in the universities of Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth century, both to better understand the European's *forma mentis*, as to understand the influence of the Western culture in the outlining of the people from the New World's mentality.

And if the enormous force given to medieval studies mainly along the twentieth century allow in our times that the human community has a better understanding of its own intellectual itinerary, the gap in relation to the period between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, as Pasnau pointed out, is still overwhelming, due to, among other factors, the volume of the textual legacy produced all through them and whose knowledge eludes us. Part of this legacy inhabits in Portuguese libraries and results from the teaching in the Portuguese universities of Coimbra and Évora, in the sixteenth century, which closely depends to the one spread in the Spanish Universities of Salamanca and Alcalá, only to mention the most distinguished and most vigorous universities at the time.

As it is well-known, F. Stegmüller<sup>7</sup> recorded the material available, printed or manuscript, related to the university's teachings of philosophy and theology in Portugal in the sixteenth century, and Lohr reunited and completed this information in the context of Renaissance Aristotelianism<sup>8</sup>. Nevertheless, this is practically untouched ground in the scientific community. Although merely exploratory, the studies we have conducted based on this manuscript textual legacy in the field of Political Philosophy and Law have proven to be fruitful, as they allow us to monitor the flow of ideas and their textual sources, the erosion of concepts and the freedom of thinking, that to some extent can be verified in the commentaries by the teachers therein involved. By applying the same comparative method we used for the textual legacy where there are doctrines of Philosophy of Law, a project in Salamanca on the commentaries to Aquinas' Summa of Theology, by authors whose names are associated to the salmantino

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<sup>7</sup> F. STEGMÜLLER, *Filosofia e Teologia nas Universidades de Coimbra e Évora no séc. XVI*, Universidade de Coimbra, Coimbra, 1959.

<sup>8</sup> C. LOHR, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries. II Renaissance Authors*. Firenze, Leo Olschki, 1988.

university's teaching period, was developed and placed in disagreement Bartholomew of Medina and Francisco Suárez' comments on S. Th I.IIae, qq. 22-48, on the doctrine of emotions. More recently, we extended this study to the Commentaries on *De Anima* of Aristotle, produced in Portuguese universities, hoping to continue to contribute to a better understanding of the doctrinal project of the corporate Jesuit schools in such fundamental issues as those pertaining to the continuation of discussions in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries about the nature of the soul, its relation to the body, the possibility to prove by reason its immortality, or the possibility of man to achieve his ultimate natural or supernatural end.

Here, we are going to expose the partial result of the study carried out on F. Suarez' *De passionibus*, which is part of his commentary on Aquinas' *Suma of Theology*, I-IIae, qq. 22-48. The treatise by Suarez is not in itself highly revealing, particularly when compared with other major works by the same author and in the case of philosophical works about human psychology when confronted with his Commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, now translated into Spanish and subject of numerous excellent studies. However, there are a few notes worth highlighting, in Suarez' *De passionibus* and serve above all to confirm the doctrines of Exímio on human nature, namely his exhaustive review on Aquinas' taxonomy on emotions and his clear choice for the division proposed by the Scotistic tradition. At the base of this option is the understanding of the structure of life based on the idea of force or trend for action, supported by Suarez in the literature of his time, either by philosophical commentaries, as is the case in his reference to Luis Vives' *De anima*, or by medical literature of his time, such is the text by Frascato.

## 2. Archeology of emotions in Suarez' *De passionibus*

If we wanted, in our days, to make a genealogy of the passions in the West, perhaps we start by quoting Plato, or Aristotle indeed, being paradigmatic for the theme, the first two books of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. However, this genealogy is available today in the fairly complete analysis done by Simo Knuuttila, specifically in his book *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*<sup>9</sup>. Undeniably, this work is currently considered a

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<sup>9</sup> S. KNUUTTILA, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, Oxford University Press., Oxford, 2004.

necessary reference in the study of the passions, especially regarding that of the history of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy.

Consequently, our goal here is confined to closely review the Suarez' comment in his *De passionibus*, Disputation I, Sections I to III, in order to establish which are the authorities on which grounds he exposures and what their doctrine is on the nature of emotions. Therefore, being a controlled purpose and seemingly unambitious, it is however certain that both the above text of Suarez and his doctrine about emotions have not been the subject of particular attention from scholars, despite it being a rather interesting and enlightening theme, both for suarezian anthropology, and the understanding of how the expert discourses with tradition, as well as to identify elements that to some extent anticipate in his work doctrines later developed by the *novatores*.

Suarez' treatise *De passionibus* is part of his broader treatise on human acts. It corresponds to the content that results from his teaching on moral theology, which, according to this period's curriculum of theology, should comment Thomas Aquinas' *Summa of Theology*. In fact, Suárez' *De passionibus* proposes to review *Summa of Theology*, I-IIa, qq. 22-48, in which Aquinas exposes his doctrine about the passions of the soul, bringing together the main theories available in the previous tradition and justifying his own doctrine based in Aristotelian hylomorphism. However, despite Suárez closely follows the external model of the Thomistic treatise on emotions, it turns out that he clearly distances himself in many aspects and especially in the crucial question about the nature of emotions. The issues that are inherent to the question relate to this set of problems: what they are, in fact, this type of movements or affections, designated emotions? Are they acts of the soul? So why are they called passions, given its active condition? Perhaps because are they referred to our body's passivity which undergoes the shocks from the outside world in its sensitive structure? In this case, the soul is passive with respect to body's movement. But if so, in what way does the body transmit to the soul such clashes? Is it in fact the passive and the active soul in the face of external conditions? The answer to these questions finds, on the one hand, an anthropology, especially the way in which one will assume the relation between the body and the soul, matter and spirit, in the human compound, and secondly, a moral doctrine, where the border of human activity can be set, between the domains of rational and irrational activity, between that which is involuntary and that which is consented. It

is for this reason that Suarez' treatise on emotions is part of his broader treatise on human acts.

As our goal here is to draw an archeology on emotions, indicating Suarez' historical and doctrinal position, followed by his commentary, particular attention will be given to the authorities he cites and the position he assumes with the tradition that he comments. Once we understand Suarez' position regarding the cited authors, we will identify his doctrine and we will verify that, denying the Thomistic doctrine on emotions, it approaches itself to the doctrines espoused by the Scotistic school. However, from the analysis of Suarez' text one can deduce that he adds something more to the medieval dispute between schools, Thomist and Scotistic on emotions, specifically by enhancing the medical literature of his time and by introducing, in his notion of the nature of emotions, some elements found there.

In the historiographical revision that he makes on the classic doctrines emotions, Suárez closely follows Thomas Aquinas, reporting, such as Aquinas, to the Stoics and the Greek and Latin fathers. Regarding the stoic sources, Aquinas' source is mostly the *De civitate dei*, by Augustine, both for Cicero's definition of passions as *perturbationes animae*<sup>10</sup>, as for the exposure of the subject of the passions, taking as reference the XIV Book of *De civitate dei*. Suárez refers to the same sources, but adds a rich set of references to the stoic sources, citing especially Cicero, in Book IV of *Disputationes Tusculanae*, and Seneca, in *Epistle* 119, to Lucilius, and the treatise *De ira*, to Novato, and *De finibus*.

Again in the wake of Aquinas', Suárez cites the Holy Scripture, namely S. Paul's text, in the *Epistle to the Romans*, 7, 35, some Bible commentaries of the Latin fathers, Jerome and Augustine, and finally the Greek fathers, in particular the reference to *De fide orthodoxa* II, 22, by John Damascene. In fact, this latter text is in itself a historiographical recompilation of the classical doctrines, Greek and Latin, on the passions, while it exposes a true doctrine on the subject. Paradigmatic for the treatment

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<sup>10</sup> Suárez discusses the issue on the nature of the passions in Sections I a III of *Disputationes* I from his *De passionibus*. F. SUÁREZ, *De actibus, qui vocantur passiones, tum etiam de habitus, praesertim studiosis, ac vitiosis* in *Opera Omnia*, Editio Nova a D. M. André, iuxta editionem venetianam. Tomo IV, Ed. Vivès, Paris, 1861, pp. 456-478. *De passionibus* [DP], Disputation I, Sectiones 1-3. Thomas Aquinas, S. Th., I-IIae, q. 22, articles 1 a 3 serve as reference. S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Summa Theologiae*, I-IIae, q. 22, articulus 1, 2 et 3. BAC, Madrid, 1984, 4 ed., pp. 157-161.



of the passions, it will be an obligatory reference for medieval scholastics authors, having become a canonical text in the debate about the nature of emotions.

Suarez pays particular attention to *De fide orthodoxa* II, 22, in which John Damascene refers to emotions where the perception factor intervenes, hence the internal senses' activity, namely imagination and memory. Suarez holds from this tradition the fact that emotions are acts of the sensitive appetite, specific to the living being, standing thus at the boundary between the material body and the rational soul. Since in animals there is the union between body and sensitive soul, emotions give up, Suárez would admit, in this intermediate reality: it is a vital movement of the spirit, which has consequences on the body<sup>11</sup>. Thus we arrive at the first definition given by Suarez on the nature of emotions: «Every act of the sensible appetite is called emotion and this is indeed what emotion is»<sup>12</sup>.

This vital motion is an act of the sensible appetite which receives the impact of the representation produced by the internal senses. Therefore, although the Fathers and the Stoics sometimes claim for emotions a negative function, emphasizing that they are an irrational motion, according to Suarez this is not their main characteristic. Exactly because emotions result from a movement localized in the sensible appetite of living beings, they are produced in a first level of perception, absent from deliberation and decision. Hence, emotions as passions or affections of the soul do not have immediate nor evident moral implication, as Suarez writes:

«There is no reason to always use the term emotions in a negative sense, since even when it is in agreement with reason, the movement of the appetite may cause changes in the body»<sup>13</sup>.

In the same first Disputation, Section I, 3, Suárez clearly explains the nature of emotions, always localizing them in the sensitive appetite:

«Emotions are not to be found in cognitive potency, nor even in the voluntary one, although they suppose some degree of desire»<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> In the introduction of *Disputatio* I from *De passionibus*, Suárez affirms he is going to cover the *de actibus mediis, id est, de affectibus animi seu passionibus*, adding that, although their study belongs to Natural Philosophy and that doctors greatly deal with it, they too belong to Moral Science. Cf. *DP I Proemio*, p. 455, col. 2.

<sup>12</sup> *DP I, I, 2* p. 456, col. 1: “(...) omnes actus appetitus sensitivi est, et dicitur animae passio.”

<sup>13</sup> *DP I, I, 2*, p. 456, c.1, in finem: “ (...) non est cur passionis nomen semper in malam partem usurpemos, quia omnis appetitus motio, etsi rationi consuetanea sit, potest in corpore alterationem excitari, sicque dic *passio*.”

This thesis is based on the distinction made by Suarez between the function of cognitive potency, which receives representations and produces the act of knowledge, and the appetitive potency, which is merely receptive regarding the act of the appetite. From this explanation, Suárez grasps the following distinction: so far as the act of knowledge presupposes cognitive potency, and regarding the general definition of potency, knowledge can be considered also as *passio*. However, in the proper sense, the movement caused in the body by the changes of corporal humors is what is properly called emotions and it is originated by the vital appetite, this movement is not necessarily linked with the act of apprehending:

«The changes of corporal humors and movements, from which derives the term emotions, properly and *per se* are originated in the acts of the appetite, and not just from the apprehension and imagination»<sup>15</sup>.

Suárez considers that there is an appetitive tension of the soul toward the object of its appetite. This tension happens with no intervention of knowledge and will, and even with no intervention of internal sensitive potencies. Emotions are these kinds of movements: *motiones et instinctus dicuntur passiones*. Therefore, they are radically distinguished from the activity of rational potencies, insofar that the activity of these latter is spiritual. By contrast, the activity of the appetite is material and corporeal, as Suarez says: «(...) appetites are material and corporeal. Hence, properly and *per se*, they cause movements and changes in the body»<sup>16</sup>.

Although Suarez claims he is commenting on Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*, he puts forward a doctrine on emotions which decisively deviates him from Aquinas' doctrine on the subject. The explanation Aquinas gives on emotions is based on the Aristotelian notion of the movement of the bodies in the physical world. So, it is based on the Aristotelian notions of act and potency, and Aquinas applies it in an analogical way to grasp the movement of the living bodies.

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<sup>14</sup> F. Suarez, *DP I, I, 3*, p. 456, col. 2: “(...) has passiones neque in potentia cognoscente, neque in appetitu rationali reperiri.”Suárez refers to Aristotle's *el De Anima*, without indicating the specific place.

<sup>15</sup> F. Suarez, *DP I, I, 3*, p. 456, col 1: “ Dicendum est has passiones neque in potentia cognoscentem neque in appetitu rationale reperiri.”

<sup>16</sup> F. Suárez, *DP I, I, 3*, p. 456, col 1: “(...) advertendum est actus quosdam reperiri in voluntate, qui similes sunt illis, qui in appetitu sensitivo *passiones* dicuntur, ut ex dicendis constabit; differunt tamen, quia actus voluntatis sunt spirituales omnino, et absque corporali organo perficiuntur: at vero appetitus materiales sunt et corporei”.

### 3. Suárez against Aquinas, on the nature of emotions.

After analyzing the nature and definition of emotions (*DPI*, I) and discussing whether these vital movements are good or bad (*DP* I, II), in Section III Disputatio I, Suárez establishes the general division of emotions and states what distinguishes emotions from the appetite. The taxonomy of emotions is at the core of Suarez's disagreement with Aquinas. He stands out mainly in two features. First, he rejects Aquinas' arguments on the real distinction between concupiscible and irascible appetite. Then, he rejects the taxonomy of emotions stated by Thomas Aquinas, and only accepts it for its functional feature<sup>17</sup>.

Suarez recognizes it is commonly accepted that emotions are divided into two types of movements of the soul: the concupiscible and the irascible. However, not all authors explain this division according to the same *ratio*. Thomas Aquinas states that there are two types of appetite, one tending toward good, and the other toward arduous good, which is apprehended as noxious. Like the author he refers to, Suarez' criticism on Aquinas' division of the appetite is based on the definition of arduous good. Suarez focuses on Aquinas' *S. Th.* I-IIae, q. 25, art. 3, ad 2 and states that Aquinas' notion of arduous good introduces badness in its *ratio*. Doing so, Aquinas' assumes that the emotions of the irascible appetite are originated by the apprehension of a noxious good, which would be the cause of the movement of rejection. Therefore, emotions originated by the irascible appetite would be the various features resulting from that rejection.

Aquinas introduces hope within the division of emotions originated by irascible appetite<sup>18</sup>, and Suarez completely rejects this fact. He considers that, doing so, Aquinas introduces ambiguity in the notion of arduous good, as he claims:

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<sup>17</sup> The Thomistic classification is as follows: passions of the concupiscible appetite (love / hate, desire / aversion, pleasure / pain); Passions of the irascible appetite: hope / despair, courage / fear, anger. On the subject see S. KNUUTILA, «Medieval Theories of the Passions of the Soul» in H. LAGERLUND; M. YRJÖNSUURI (ed) *Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht / Boston / London, 2002, p. 49-83.

<sup>18</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *S. Th.*, I-IIae, q. 25, art 3, resp. *op. cit.*, p. 162: “ (...) sic ergo patet quod spes est prima inter omnes passiones [na ordem da geração] irascibilis.” (*op. cit.*, p. 174). There are passions whose object is good and passions whose object is bad. And this happens in two appetites, irascible and concupiscible. *S. Th.*, I-IIae, q. 23, art 1, resp.: “ (...) obiectum potentiae concupiscibilis est bonum vel malum sensibile simpliciter acceptum, quod est delectabile vel dolorosum; (...) ipsum bonum vel malum, secundum quod habet rationem ardui vel difficilis, est obiectum irascibilis.”

«(...) with the term arduous we refer to the good which is to some extent arduous, for instance, the good which is excellent and just because of its excellency; or the good which must be loved above all other goods, or the absent good, or the good which cannot be achieved without effort/pain, or that in which some *ratio* of badness is involved. And whatever the solution, it seems absolutely necessary that concupiscible good also intends on arduous good, since all love and desire refers to concupiscible appetite»<sup>19</sup>.

The crucial point of Suárez' criticism is that he states that all appetite is appetite for good, and that the difference between concupiscible and irascible appetite is on the twofold way of the perception of that good. Good can be perceived as a desirable, or it can be perceived as a good of its achievement hindered by an obstacle. In the first case, the concupiscible appetite is put in evidence, as the movement of the soul tending toward the loved good; in the second case, the same appetite is put in evidence, but «hindered by an obstacle». In this latter case, the appetite toward good is put in evidence by means of a difficulty which distances the achievement of the loved good. Therefore, in this case, the same appetite is in action, that is, the concupiscible one, as it tends toward good, but this good is aimed by hindrance of an obstacle». As Suárez says,

«two features can be considered in the object of the appetite. One is the good itself as desirable and what contributes to its achievement. The other is what prevents the achievement of that good and deprives from the loved good; therefore, the appetite is called concupiscible, insofar as it desires the good; and it is called irascible, insofar as it rises up against what removes the achievement of the good»<sup>20</sup>.

And Suarez concludes:

«Therefore, we can explain in a different way the terms *irascible* and *concupiscible*. And in fact I state that they are not two opposite appetites but they are one and the same notion, which can be understood in different manners, since we can consider two appetites in the object of desire. There is the desirable good itself, and what *per se* can opposite to its achievement. This latter is

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<sup>19</sup> F. Suárez, *DP I, III, 1*, p. 458, col. 2: “Nam vel ardui nomine intelligitur bonum aliquod arduum, scilicet excellens, ut excellens: vel bonum absens, vel quod non sine labore comparari potest aut cuius acquisitio habet aliquam rationem mali: at quidquid horum significetur, necessarium omnino videtur concupiscibilem in bonis etiam ardui versari, omnis enim amor et desiderium ad concupiscibilem spectat”.

<sup>20</sup> F. Suárez, *DP I, III, 1*, p. 458, col. 2: “ (...) in objecto enim appetitus duo considerari possunt. Primum ipsum bonum appetibile, et quae ad illud consequendum per se conferunt: alterum est id quod impedit talis boni consecutionem, et bono nos privat amato: appetitus ergo quatenus bonum appetit concupiscibilis dicitur, quatenus vero insurgit in eum, qui huiusmodi bonum impedit, ut suum bonum tueatur, irascibilis dicitur.”

what impedes the achievement of the loved good and removes us from it. Therefore, the appetite insofar as it is appetite toward good is called concupiscible; and insofar as it is based on that which prevents the achievement of that good, and protects that good as desirable for us, is called irascible»<sup>21</sup>.

In conclusion, Suárez' doctrine regards emotions as a movement of the living being, stating there is no real distinction between concupiscible and irascible appetite. There is one and the same movement toward the loved good which is twofold: either it is easily achieved, and in this case, this movement is followed by pleasure, or it is achieved by means of difficulty, and in this case, it is followed by pain. According to this doctrine, Suarez considers that the different taxonomies on emotions are to some extent only functional, since they depend on the definition given by each author on the nature of the vital appetite of living beings. What he has just explained, in these first three sections of his *De passionibus' Disputatio* I, is at the core of his notion on the nature of emotions and is the basis for the correct understanding of their nature. According to this doctrine, he will analyze each of the traditional lists of emotions on the other sections of this first *Disputatio* of his *De passionibus*<sup>22</sup>.

#### 4. Suarez' use of medical literature

Suárez's criticisms regarding the Thomistic doctrine on the nature and taxonomy of emotions have its historical background in the fourteenth century's criticism between Scotistics and Thomistics on the same subject. In *Disputatio* I, Section I to III of his *De passionibus*, Suárez gives an account on the main doctrines of both Schools. Against

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<sup>21</sup> F. Suárez, *DP* I, III, 3, p. 458, col.2: "Aliter ergo possumus rationes nominum *irascibilis et concupiscibilis* explicare, opinor enim non duos appetitus, sed eundem diverso modo conceptum significari, in objecto enim appetitus duo considerari possunt. Primum ipsum bonum appetibile, et quae ad illud consequendum per se conferunt: alterum est id, quod impedit talis boni consecutionem, et bono nos privat amato: appetitus ergo quatenus bonum appetit *concupiscibilis* dicitur, quatenus vero insurgit in eum, qui hujusmodi bonum impedit, ut suum bonum tueatur, *irascibilis* dicitur".

<sup>22</sup> In his own classification Suárez proposes the reduction to six passions: love, desire, delight, anger, fear and sadness. Cf. F. Suarez, *DP* I, XII, 2: p. 475, col. 1.

the thomistic' real distinction between concupiscible and irascible appetites – from which derives, among other consequences, the fact that it establishes a link between the virtue of hope and the irascible appetite - Suárez puts forward another statement which goes back to Albertus Magnus, followed by Scotus and Gabriel Biel. These theologians state that the tendency which originates emotions is only one and the same: the appetite towards good. In consequence, hope is nothing more than this appetite when it faces an obstacle for the good to be achieved. Suarez clearly adopts this doctrine.

In a first glance, what Suarez is discussing in his *De passionibus* is the definition of the place of emotions within human actions, in order to understand both their moral value, their place in the way to Christian perfection and their influence in the practice of theological virtues, as is the case of hope. Suarez's aim in the debate is undoubtedly focused on human moral perfection. However, in his explanation there are some interesting elements in the text denoting novelty regarding the medieval tradition, in Suárez' statement of emotions. These data are the preference and praise made by Suárez to the works of philosophers and doctors linked with the humanistic movement. Suárez explicitly refers to Luis Vives' *De anima* and to some books of medical literature, particular quoting Galean's *De symptomatum causis liber tres* and *De affectorum locorum notitia libri sex*<sup>23</sup>, as well as the work of Geronimo Frascato (1476/78-1553), *De Sympathia et antipathia rerum, liber unus*<sup>24</sup>. Concerning this latter he

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<sup>23</sup> According to D. CAMPBELL, *Arabian Medicine and its influence on the Middle Age*, Vol II, Trubner's Oriental (reed., of the 1926, Routledge, 2001, p. 62, and p. 77, where a catalog of Latin translations of printed works Galen is published), the work *Galenii affectorum locorum notitia libris* published in Latin translation, in Venice in 1510, and successively reprinted (Paris, 1513, Paris, 1520, Paris, 1539; Venice (only books 1-3 : 1557), Lyon, 1562. It is possible that, given the precision of the quote and exact chapter indication, Suárez has used directly this source. Likewise with the other work of Galen, cited by Suarez *Symptomatum causis liber tres*. A first edition is given in London in 1524, followed by an edition in Paris, and in 1528 an edition in Venice, 1548.

<sup>24</sup> The quotation referred to by Suárez is as follows: «(...) est igitur anima quoddammodo una natura, quoddammodo non una. una quidem quatenus membrum simpliciter mixtum est, cuius est forma: ac talis quidem unius factiva est, aut plurimum ad unum; non una autem est quatenus cognoscens. Sic enim cum ad diversis movetur, diversa enim sit, aut saltem non eodem modo se habet.» *De Sympathia et antipathia rerum, liber unus*, Veneza, apud heredes Lucantonii Iuntae, 1546, p. 15. This work of Frascatoro contains his philosophy of nature, where all phenomena, from the most elementary to the complex physics of human nature are explained from the motion of attraction or repulsion – *sympathia ou antipathia*.

quotes «Book II, chapter on cognition, in the middle». The aforementioned work by Frascato was first edited in 1546, in Venice, where *De contagione et contagiosis morbus et eorum curatione liber tres* was also published. However, Book II of the *De sympathia* does not exist since there is only one Book. Nevertheless, in *De Sympathia* there is a chapter Suarez refers to and that is chapter 13, *De Sympathiis animae cognitricis*. Because of this inaccuracy, lies the doubt whether Suarez used the work directly.

According to Suarez's statements on the nature of emotions, and to the texts from the philosophical tradition, as well as from the medical literature of his time it is possible to draw some features of his doctrine on emotions. On one hand, he clearly claims the failure of the Thomistic doctrine on emotions and of its consequences in moral theology. On the other hand, Suárez strongly awards the contribution medical science giving way a better understanding both of the nature of the human body and of its physiological movements, as well as on the body-soul natural frame.

Although this study remains in an exploratory stage and still requires deeper research to verify to what extent Suarez integrates those features in his moral theology, the results of our analysis allow us to approach his thought on the nature of emotions from the theoretical position adopted by the seventeenth century philosophers towards the same subject. Suarez considers emotions as actions of a vital tendency of the living being. Therefore they are out of the scope and control of human superior potencies as cognition and will. Hence, the physicians, better than the theologians, can give a more suitable explanation on the nature of emotions. Therefore, this knowledge should be applied by those latter in the deliberation of the morality of human acts. It is true that Suarez does not put forward this argument with such evidence, but it is also true that his definition of emotions, as vital movements of the body-soul human frame, and the position he undertakes regarding the contribution of medical science gives in the description of the movements of vital appetite, bring him into line with the attitude modernity will adopt concerning the place of the corporeal structure in human nature and of its relationship with the superior faculties of man.